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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 1 L89 
WILliE DIXON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant was charged in an Information with the 
commission of the infamous crime against nature in violation 
of Title 103, Chapter 551, Section 22, Utah Code Annotated, 
1943. Tlre charging p~ut of the information being: 
"That the said Willie Dixon on or about the 1st 
day of February, 1948, in the County of Tooele, State 
of Utah, did then and there wilfully, knowingly, un-
lawfully and feloniously commit an abominable and 
despicable crime against nature, to-wit, that the said 
Willie Dixon did then and there place his private part 
in the mouth of one Milton Vern ell Stewart." 
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4 
The charge grew out of an alleged offence committed by 
the defendant in the building in which the picture show was 
being conducted in what is known as Todd Park in Tooele 
County, Utah ,and the defendant was charged with the com-
mission of the offense as set forth in the above referred to 
Information. 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
After the complaint was filed against the defendant, a pre-
liminary hearing was had before Justice of the Peace F. W. 
Frailey, in Tooele City, Utah. At that time and as a basis of 
binding the defendant over for trial the young boy, Vernell 
Steward, who the record showed was but four years of age, 
having not yet reached his fifth birthday at the time of the 
commisison of the alleged offense, testified that the act was 
committed by the defendant in the toilet room of the building 
in which the picture show was being conducted and in the 
early afternoon of the elate in question. The evidence will 
show that the toilet room is an open room and although par-
tioned off in three stalls, only in one stall was a toilet bowl, and 
there was nothing but a two-by-four frame around the stalls 
so that a person could r.e seen from any position in the toilet 
room. The young boy testified that the act took place in this 
toilet room and at the preliminary hearing he was supported 
by three boys ranging from 11 to 13 years of age, to-wit, 
Richard Harris, Lorin Smith and Clifford Webb, and the 
evidence showed that the door into the toilet room had no 
latch on and had no catch on to hold the door shut, and this 
boy's testimony in the preliminary hearing was that while en-
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gaged in the operation of the offense charged, the defendant 
stood with his back toward the door holding it so that it could 
not be opened, and that the three boys forced the door open 
and there found the defendant with his pants unbuttoned and 
with the small boy standing somewhere near him. Upon this 
testimoy the Justice of the Peace held the defendant to answer 
to the charge in the District Court. 
When the case was tried in the District Court, the small 
boy and the three other boys testified that they had no knowl-
edge of the commission of the offense in the toilet room, but 
that when they went in the toilet room the defendant went 
out and Vernell Smith, the small boy, went out also. That 
about a minute later they saw the two go around the corner a 
little to the west of the toilet room and they went and sat down 
on a bench in the outside hall and in about a minute the two 
came back out of the hall; that the defendant's pants were fully 
buttoned; that he had his hands in his pockets, but that the 
small boy was wiping his lips with his hands. All of these 
accusations were denied by the defendant . 
.ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
Comes now the defendant and appellant and makes the 
following assignments of error upon which he will rely for 
a reversal of the judgment appealed from in this cause: 
1. The Court erred in permitting the witness, Vernell 
Stewart, to testify over the defendant's objections as to the 
witness' qualifications to testify. (T. pages 7-9). 
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2. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict of not guilty. 
3. The Court erred in permitting the verdict of the jury 
of guilty to stand against. the defendant. 
4. The Court erred in denying the defendant's motion 
for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
The first Assignment of Error is directed toward the 
court's permitting the witness, Vernell Stewart to testify over 
the defendant's objection as to his qualification to do so on 
account of his extreme immature age and as to his ability to 
do so. The State's Attorney in attempting to qualify him 
asked him, "Do you know what happens if a little boy tells 
a lie?" And he answered that question by saying, "Put in 
jail." To which the prosecuting attorney put this question, 
"He is punished for it, isn't he?" The court then interrupted 
by saying, "You said he was put in jail, did you, Vernell ?" To 
which the witness answered "yes", and then the following 
questions were asked by the prosecuting attorney: 
Q. You know what "to tell the truth", Vernell, means, 
don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You know what you mean when you tell the Court 
you will tell the truth ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What would you do if you tell the Court you will 
tell the truth ~ You will tell the truth, will you? 
A. Yes. 
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7 
Upon the basis of this kind of questioning the prosecuting 
attorney concluded that the witness is competent to testify. 
(T.p.6). 
The defense attorney then asked him the following ques-
tions: 
Q. Do you know what it means to take an oath when 
you raise your hand, son? 
A. Unh-uh. 
Q. You don't know what that means at all, do you? 
You say you will go to jail if you tell a lie. Do 
you know what would happen to you if you go to 
jail? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. What would happen to you? 
At that time the Court interrupted him with the following 
statement: 
You will tell Mr. Shields what you think would 
happen, Vernell, if you told a lie. What would happen 
to you? Do you know who Mr. Shields is, that man 
sitting out there that just asked you that question? 
A. Here? 
The Court: You see him. He has got a tie on that 
has some yellow in it. 
A. Get put in jail. 
Q. (By Mr. Shields) You say you would be put in 
jail if you told a lie. Would anything else happen 
to you if you told a lie? Nothing else would 
happen to you except you would be put in jail; 
is that right? 
A. (Witness indicated the affirmative by a nod of 
the head.) 
Mr. Shields: I don't believe he is qualified. (T. p 7) 
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The court then undertakes to examine the boy. 
The Court then asked him when his birthday was, how 
old he was, what color has pants were, what color his shirt 
was, and then asked him if he has any friends and if so to name 
any boys that he plays with. To which he answered "Unh-uh." 
The Court then followed by asking him if he would tell 
the truth if the Court asked him to tell the truth, to which he 
said, "Uh-huh." Then he was asked the following questions: 
Q. Do you think you are a good boy or a bad boy if 
you tell the truth? 
A. Bad boy. 
Q. Do you think you are a good boy or a bad boy if 
you told the truth-if you told the truth would you 
be a bad boy or a good boy? 
A. Good boy. (T. p. 7). 
The Court then qualifies the witness and overrules the 
objection to 4is testimony. The Court then instructs the boy 
to stand up and be sworn, to which an objection was made 
by the defense attorney. (T. p. 9). 
The witness then on direct examination stated that he 
saw the defendant on the day in question at the picture show, 
and when asked if he said anything to him at that time, 
answered, "Unh-uh." The boy then testified that the defend-
ant wanted him to suck his pee pee for a dime, but that he didn't 
give him a dime, and then when asked what happened after 
he was asked to suck his pee pee, stated that the three boys 
pushed the door open and went into the toilet room, and that 
the defendant then left the bathroom and took him around 
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went into the toilet room testified that there was no such 
actions going on when they went in there. The witness then 
testified that he took him around the corner into the hall and 
there wanted him to suck his pee pee a little, and that he sucked 
it a little, and then he went back into the free show. (T. pages 
11 and 12). 
On Cross Examination, the following questions and 
answers were asked and received from the boy witness after 
stating that he and his father came to the Court House and to 
the Sheriff's Office: 
Q. Let me ask you if, in that conversation you didn't 
say to the Sheriff that he didn't put his private in 
your mouth? 
A. Unh-uh. 
Q. Didn't you tell the Sheriff that? 
A. (Witness nodded head in negative.) 
Q. Didn't you tell the man you were talking to in the 
Sheriff's office, you didn't? 
A. Who? 
Q. That this man here, Mr. Dixon, didn't put his pee 
pee-that is what you call it, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn't you tell the sheriff down there in his office, 
that he didn't put it in your mouth, when you and 
your father were there? 
A. Unh-uh. 




The Court: What do you mean when you say "unh-
uh"? What is your answer to that? 
A. Don't know. 
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The Court: Do you mean "Yes" or "No", when you 
say that? 
A. "No". 
The Court: Say "No" instead of saying "Unh-uh"; or 
Yes" instead of saying "Uh-huh". 
Q. (By Mr. Shields) Let me ask you this: Didn't 
you say down there, to the sheriff, in the Sheriff's 
office downstairs, that you didn't put his pee pee 
in your mouth, but you licked it? 
A. Yes, I licked it. 
Q. That is what you said to the Sheriff, wasn't it? Do 
you remember that? 
A. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.) 
Q. And that was the truth, wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You remember saying that now, don't you? 
A. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.) (T. pages 
16 and 17). 
The witness then testified that while in the toilet room, 
as follows: 
Q. You came over here by him then, did you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then, Vernell, what did he do, or what did you do? 
A. He wanted to let me suck his pee pee, and those boys 
was trying to get in. 
Q. What boys was trying to get in? 
A. Them over there. 
Q. Those boys over there, all three of them? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say he was holding it with his back towards it? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And you were out in the door on this side of him; 
is that right? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And those three boys couldn't push that door open? 
A. No. He took me around the corner, and they got in. 
Q. Took you around what corner? 
A. Around that corner. 
Q. Tell me what corner? 
A. Around by the back door. 
Q. Can you tell me, on this drawing, where that door is? 
A. Unh-uh, I can't. 
Q. Was it outside of this toilet room ? 
A. Yes. He went outside, then turned over by the 
telephone, then turned the other way. 
A. Down this hall here? 
A. Yes; and there is a door that it takes you outside. 
Q. The door is down in this place, down in here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you go outside? 
A. No. 
Q. You stayed in this hall that goes over here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is this the hall that goes over to the picture show? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then where did he go? 
A. Then he went, and I went back to the free show. 
Q. You left there and went back into the show, is that 
it? 
A. Yes. (T. pages 21 and 22). 
Lorin Smith testified that when they went into the toilet 
room he was buttoning up his pants, and that he was in front 
of the door; that is where the door would be and not by the 
two by four, and that would be right back from the toilet bowl 
in there, and that when they went in he was standing there 
buttoning his pants, that he didn't see his privates and nobody 
said anything to him at all. (T. p. 55). 
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He testified about the defendant and Vernell Stewart go-
ing around the corner into the hall, and that after they went 
out of the toilet room they could be seen from the sidewalk 
until they went around the corner the other way; that after 
they left the toilet room it was about a minute before the 
boys came out and at that time the defendant and V ernell 
Stewart were going around the corner and he was asked: 
Q. Did you follow them around? 
A. No. 
Q. Why? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. You didn't suspect there was anything wrong going 
on ,did youl 
A. No. 
Q. There hadn't been anything happen at all that 
would cause you to suspect anything wrong was 
going on? 
A. No. 
Q. And you didn't see anything wrong at all, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Not at any time? 
A. No. (T. page 58). 
And then again: 
Q. You are positive he had a coat and hat on? 
A. Yes. 
Q. A cap and coat on; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Couldn't be any doubt about that? 
A. No. 
Q. Now when Mr. Dixon came around from the cor-
ner, where were his hands then? 
A. In his pockets. 
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Q. In his pockets. His pants weren't unbuttoned, were 
they? 
A. No. 
Q. You saw them go around the corner when they 
came out of the toilet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long were they around the corner before they 
came back? 
A. About two or three minutes. 
Q. About two or three minutes. It might have been 
only one minute, mightn't it? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. You don't think so. But it was a very short time, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when they came around, Mr. Dixon had his 
hands in his pockets? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And his pants weer fully buttoned up? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And there wasn't anything about that that caused 
any alarm in your mind? 
A. No; only that litle kid was spitting. 
Q. Did that cause some alarm in your mind because 
the kid was spitting? 
A. No. 
Q. It is very often the case that kids spit, isn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have seen them do it many times? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That didn't cause you any alarm, did it? 
A. No. 
Q. And he didnt say a word to you about anything 
when he came around there? 
A. No. (T. pages 59 and 60.) 
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Certainly the three boys who were there didn't see any-
thing that caused any alarm in their mind about anything that 
was going on, which, of course, leaves the small boy's testimony 
standing alone as to any commission of the offense charged in 
the Information and of which the defendant was convicted. 
We now desire to call the court's attention to some 
authorities concerning this matter. 
We, of course, do not believe that the testimony of the 
small boy was competent and inasmuch as there was no other 
testimony concerning the commission of the act at all, let us 
call the Court's attention to the law which definitely states 
that there must be a penetration of the private part into the 
mouth of the victim in order to constitute an offense. In 
suport of this theory, we call the court's attention to an Oregon 
case, State vs. Start, 132 Pac. 512 at 513: 
"It is said in Section 1539 L.O.L. that 'proof of 
actual penetration into the body is sufficient to sustain 
an indictment for rape or for the crime against nature. 
No particular opening of the body into which pene-
tration can be made is specified in this section. 
It follows that the actual penetration of the virile 
member into any orifice of the human body except the 
vaginal opening of a female is sufficient for the estab-
lishment of the crime in question." 
I now refer to 48 Am. Jur. at page 5 50, wherein the follow-
ing is stated: 
"And when the crime of sodomy or the crime against 
nature is committed. where the act consists of penetra-
tion of the mouth. As stated by one court in construing 
the statute on this subject, since no particular opening 
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of the body into which penetration can be made is 
specified, it follows that the actual penetration of 
the virile member into any orifice of the human body 
except the vaginal opening of a female is sufficient for 
the establishment of the crime in question." 
In State vs. McGruder (Iowa), 101 N.W. 646, it appears 
that the language of the statute defining "sodomy"' includes 
penetration in any opening of the body other than the sexual 
parts. 
In the case of Means vs. State, a Wisconsin case, 104 N.W. 
815, it was decided under a statute which specifically provided 
that said crime may be committed by the penetration of the 
mouth. 
In the case of Weaver vs. Territory (Arizona) 127 Pac. 
724, it was held: 
"That a statute providing for any sexual penetration, 
however slight, would not sustain a conviction of 
sodomy where the act was committed by penetration of 
the mouth, yet it would seem that the better reasoning 
was with the court in the case of State vs. Start. 
This is the Oregor:. case hereinabove referred to. 
In the case of Kinnan vs. State, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 478, 
it is said: 
Though there is a conflict of opinion on this ques-
tion, weight of authority and the best-reasoned cases 
sustain Glover vs. State in holding that one may be 
convicted of the crime of sodomy or the crime against 
nature when the act is committed by penetration of 
the mouth. 
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In the case of State vs. Long, a Louisiana case, at 63 So. 
180, is the following: 
"Whoever shall be convicted of the detestable and 
abominable crime against nature, committed with man-
. kind, or with the mouth, shall," etc., was held sufficient 
when read in the light of the common law, and of the 
history of the crime of sodomy at common law, to 
sustain an indictment when the act was committed by 
penetration of the mouth. 
There are a great number of cases along this line holding 
the same thing, and we cite them to show that in order that 
the crime of which the defendant is charged could be com-
mitted, there must be shown that there was a penetration of 
the mouth, and we find no case that relaxes this rule. 
We, therefore, again refer to the testimony of the small 
boy, Vernell Stewart, as found on page 17 of the transcript, as 
follows: 
Q. Let me ask you this: Didn't you say down there, 
to the sheriff, in the sheriff's office downstairs, that 
you didn't put his pee pee in your mouth, but you 
licked it? 
A. Yes, I licked it. 
Q. That is what you said to the sheriff, wasn't it? Do 
you remember that? 
A. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.) 
We repeat that this evidence is significant and is binding 
as to what happened, if anything happened, with this young 
boy and the defendant, and conclusively shows that there was 
no penetration into the mouth of the little boy at all, and in 
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absence of proof of penetration, we say that the evidence does 
not support a conviction of the defendant. 
We desire to call the court's attention to the testimony 
of .Mr. Dixon concerning what happened there that day con-
tained in the transcript, pages 76 to 97, inclusive, and we say 
unequivocally that the evidence is not sufficient to convict 
the defendant of the charge layed in the information. 
Now while we are fully aware of the law concerning 
competency of witnesses, we desire to call the court's attention 
to a few cases on that pomt. The statute of 1943, Section 
104-49-2, under who may not be witnesses, is as follows: 
Sub-section ( 2) Children under ten years of age, 
who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of 
the facts respecting which they are examined, or of 
relating them truly. 
We submit that an examination of the testimony of this 
small boy brings him under the category above referred to. 
In the case of State vs. Blyth, 20 Utah 3 78, this statute 
was referred to, and the court had this to say: 
"As will be noticed this provision of the statute does 
not apply to all children under ten years of age, but 
to such only as 'appear incapable of receiving just 
impressions of facts,' concerning the subject of inquiry, 
or of stating them truly." 
And then it goes on to say: 
"When, therefore, objection is made to the com-
petency of a child under ten years of age, it becomes a 
question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial 
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18 
court, and the appellate court will not interfere, if the 
lower court, upon examination made upon its voir 
dire, or upon all of its testimony, concludes that the 
child is competent to testify, unless there is a clear 
abuse of discretion apparent from the record." 
We submit that there was an abuse of discretion upon the 
part of the court in allowing this witness to testify, and that 
the record so shows. 
In the case of Darneal vs. State of Oklahoma, 1 A.L.R. 
638, we have the following: 
"He first contends that the court erred in permitting 
Rachael Garrison, a girl nine years of age, to testify 
as a witness against him. - The statute of this state 
governing the competency of witnesses of tender age 
is as folows: "The following persons shall be incom-
petent to testify. . .. 2. Children under ten years of 
age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions 
of the facts representing which they are examined, or 
of relating them truly." 
It is apparent from the reading of the above statute 
that the question of the competency of a witness under 
ten years of age is a matter addressed peculiarly to the 
discretion of the trial court. If the trial court permits 
such a witness to testify, and it appears conclusively 
from the record on appeal that there has been an abuse 
of that sound discretion placed in such court, then this 
appellate court is authorized and will reverse a judg-
ment of conviction upon such ground if it appears that 
the testimony of such witness was prejudicial to the 
accused." 
Certainly one cannot examine this record of the testimony 
of this young boy, Vernell Stewart, without being impressed 
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with the fact that the court abused its discretion in permitting 
him to testify over the objection of the defendant. While it 
is true that the boy did a fairly good job with his testimony 
when being asked by the prosecuting attorney leading questions 
to which he could answer "Unh-uh" and "Uh-huh"' to, but 
we were never able to determine with such answers just whether 
he meant what the answers indicated or whether he actually 
knew what his answers meant, and the same result was obtained 
when the court attemped to coach him in his testimony when 
it did not appear that the prosecuting attorney was doing a very 
good job at the coaching with leading questions. 
The case of the State vs. McMillan, 46 Utah 19 at page 
22, it appears in that case that the girl in question was between 
7 and 8 years of age, and the question of her ability was raised, 
and the court in holding that it was within the discretion of 
the trial court to accept the testimony of children under 10 
years of age. The court still holds that if it is made to appear 
that the court abused its discretion in that regard, the supreme 
court may interfere with such action. 
Also, the same holding in the case of State vs. Marasco, 
42 Utah page 5 at page 8. 
We submit that a careful reading of the record in this 
case would reveal that the court abused its discretion in per-
mitting this boy to testify over the objection of the defendant, 
and while it is true that counsel and the court by asking leading 
questions, and suggestively, got some fairly good testimony 
from this young boy, yet upon his cross examination as here-
tofore referred to, he appeared as though a new light had 
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dawned upon him, and he very readily remembered what he 
had told the sheriff concerning the transaction in question, 
and we therefore submit that there is no evidence upon which 
a jury could bring in a verdict of guilty against the defendant 
in this case, and that the court should have granted the de-
fendant's motion directing the jury to bring in a verdict of 
not guilty. 
In going over this case I am very much impressed with 
the seriousness of the crime as I recall it carries a sentence in 
the state penitentiary up to 20 years. The defendant has lived 
at Todd Park for six or seven years, and has been around there, 
and the evidence shows with children on the play grounds, 
and there has been no evidence in all that time of any mis-
conduct upon his part, and even in the face of such a record 
and in the face of the extreme lack of sufficient testimony to 
convict him of the offense, the court refused to consider the 
question of probation or parole for him and sentenced him to 
a term in the State Penitentiary. 
We submit that the evidence does not support such a 
conviction or a f.nding, and that this court should reverse the 
conviction and either direct that the defendant be discharged 
or order a new trial of his case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. LEROY SHIELDS 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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